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Introduction 
Twenty years ago a unanimous United States Supreme Court decid-
ed Whren v. United States,1 a narcotics case resulting from a traffic 
stop, and held that when police officers make a traffic stop based on 
objective probable cause of criminal activity, the stop is a reasonable 
one regardless of the officers’ “actual motivations” for making the stop.2 
Under this “could have” test, the officers’ “[s]ubjective intentions play 
no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”3 As 
the Court has subsequently stated: “Our unanimous opinion [in Whren] 
held that we would not look behind an objectively reasonable traffic 
stop to determine whether racial profiling or a desire to investigate 
other potential crimes was the real motive.”4 
 
†  Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Charleston School 
of Law. As an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, I briefed 
and argued the government’s case in United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371 
(D.C. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). I would like to thank the students 
on the Case Western Reserve Law Review as well as my colleagues who partici-
pated in the symposium. I would like to dedicate this article to my mother, 
Bess Macaulay Lawton. 
1. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
2. Id. at 808–09, 813. 
3. Id. at 809, 813.  
4. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2082 (2011). 
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To say that the Whren decision was and continues to be contro-
versial is an understatement.5 As two scholars have recently written: 
“Whren v. United States is notorious for its effective legitimization of 
racial profiling in the United States.”6 Many have argued for a return 
to the “reasonable officer” test that some courts used pre-Whren as a 
means to combat the use of traffic infractions as a pretext for racial 
profiling.7 Under the “reasonable officer” test, also known as the “would 
have” test, a court reviewing an officer’s decision to perform a traffic 
stop would focus not on “whether the [officer] validly could have made 
the stop, but rather, whether a reasonable officer, given the same cir-
cumstances, would have made the stop absent the invalid purpose.”8 
The Supreme Court however has not indicated any movement away 
from the objective probable cause test.9 
In the years since the Whren decision, only two states, Washington 
and New Mexico, have determined that their state constitutions provide 
broader protection than the United States Constitution on this issue.10 
Washington was the first state to do so. Three years after Whren, the 
Washington Supreme Court ruled that its citizens held “a constitution-
ally protected interest against warrantless traffic stops or seizures on a 
mere pretext to dispense with the warrant when the true reason for the 
seizure is not exempt from the warrant requirement.”11 As discussed 
 
5. See Margaret M. Lawton, The Road to Whren and Beyond: Does the “Would 
Have” Test Work?, 57 DePaul L. Rev. 917, 928, n.77 (2008) (reviewing 
some of the scholarly literature on Whren); see also State v. Ochoa, 206 P.3d 
143, 151 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (“[T]he [Whren] Court not only refuses to 
condemn this bad police conduct [of initiating traffic stops for an unconsti-
tutional reason], it rewards pretextual stops by permitting prosecution with 
the evidentiary fruits of the stop.”). 
6. Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but Unconstitutional: Racial 
Profiling and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 882, 884 (2015); see also Lewis R. Katz, “Lonesome Road”: 
Driving without the Fourth Amendment, 36 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1413, 1471 
(2013) (arguing that the Supreme Court is “committed to not restraining 
arbitrary police discretion on our streets and highways”). 
7. Lawton, supra note 5, at 931. “Pretextual traffic stops are different from 
stops where police have falsified” the facts for probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion to make the stop. Id. at 929 n.81. 
8. Diana Roberto Donahoe, “Could Have,” “Would Have:” What the Supreme 
Court Should Have Decided in Whren v. United States, 34 Am. Crim. L. 
Rev. 1193, 1202 (1997). 
9. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1416 (2013) (“Thus, the defendant 
will not be heard to complain that although he was speeding the officer’s real 
reason for the stop was racial harassment.”). 
10. This article addresses traffic stops, not other types of Fourth Amendment 
seizures. 
11. State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833, 842 (Wash. 1999) (holding that while “police 
may enforce the traffic code . . . [t]hey may not, however, use that authority 
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below, however, Washington now distinguishes between a “pretextual 
traffic stop”12 which would be illegal and a “mixed-motive traffic stop” 
which might or might not be illegal.13 
New Mexico was the next state to determine that its state consti-
tution provided protection against pretextual traffic stops. In State v. 
Ochoa,14 the New Mexico Court of Appeals departed from Whren in-
stead finding the “federal analysis unpersuasive and incompatible with 
our state’s distinctively protective standards for searches and seizures 
of automobiles.”15 Alaska courts have considered whether its state con-
stitution provides more protection than the federal constitution, but 
have not yet decided whether to adopt the pretext doctrine.16 However, 
Alaska courts have clarified that if the pretext doctrine did apply, the 
focus would be on whether a police officer departed from “reasonable 
police practices” because of the ulterior motive.17 
In Part I, this Article briefly discusses the Whren decision. Part II 
discusses the three states that have considered whether to divert from 
the Whren decision under their own state constitutions. This Article 
then concludes that while these states have made efforts to combat 
traffic stops initiated on unconstitutional grounds, such as racial profil-
ing, these state courts are finding it hard to do in the absence of police 
admission of using a pretext. While this case law suggests that other 
means of addressing police use of pretext would be more effective than 
relying on state constitutional law remedies, the Washington mixed-
motive test perhaps comes the closest to providing a reviewing court 
with the means to address whether a police officer has exercised her 
discretion appropriately. 
 
as a pretext or justification to avoid the warrant requirement for an unrelated 
criminal investigation”). 
12. Id. at 843. 
13. State v. Arreola, 290 P.3d 983, 991 (Wash. 2012) (noting a “mixed-motive” 
traffic stop is one that is based on both legitimate and illegitimate grounds). 
14. 206 P.3d 143 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008). 
15. Id. at 148. 
16. See infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
17. Laschober v. State, No. A–11302, 2014 WL 7005586, at *4 (Alaska Ct. App. 
Dec. 10, 2014). Memorandum decisions of the Alaska Court of Appeals do 
not create legal precedent. See Alaska R. App. P. 214(d)(1) (“Citation of 
unpublished decisions . . . is not encouraged. If a party believes, nevertheless, 
that an unpublished decision has persuasive value . . . and that there is no 
published opinion that would serve as well, the party may cite the unpublished 
decision.”). 
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I. The Whren Decision 
The Fourth Amendment provides the following: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.18 
A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when police order the driver 
of an automobile to stop, and the driver complies with the order.19 As 
the Supreme Court held in Whren, “[a]s a general matter, the decision 
to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable 
cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”20 
In Whren, police officers stopped the vehicle in which Michael 
Whren was a passenger for the stated reason that the driver had vio-
lated several provisions of the District of Columbia traffic code.21 Once 
the vehicle was stopped, officers observed two large plastic bags of what 
appeared to be crack cocaine in Whren’s hands.22 The officers arrested 
Whren and the driver, James Brown, and discovered several types of 
illegal drugs during a search of the vehicle.23 Brown and Whren were 
subsequently convicted for several narcotics violations, and their con-
victions were upheld on appeal to the District of Columbia Circuit 
Court of Appeals.24 Regarding the traffic stop, the Court of Appeals 
held that “regardless of whether a police officer subjectively believes 
that the occupants of an automobile may be engaging in some other 
illegal behavior, a traffic stop is permissible as long as a reasonable 
officer in the same circumstances could have stopped the car for the 
suspected traffic violation.”25 
At the time of Whren and Brown’s petition to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, “most federal circuits followed the rule that, where an officer has 
objective probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred, 
 
18. U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
19. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007). 
20. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996).  
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 808–809. 
23. Id. at 809. 
24. Id.  
25. United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371, 375 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
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a traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”26 Two cir-
cuits, “[t]he Ninth and Eleventh, however, had held that, when a defen-
dant raised a claim of pretext, ‘the proper inquiry . . . [was] not whether 
the officer could validly have made the stop but whether under the 
same circumstances a reasonable officer would have made the stop in 
the absence of the invalid purpose.’”27 The Tenth Circuit had also adop-
ted the reasonable officer test, but prior to Whren, struck the test down 
“finding that the standard after seven years of application was ‘unwork-
able’ and led to ‘inconsistent’ results.”28 
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, petitioners Whren and 
Brown accepted that the officers had objective probable cause to believe 
that Brown had violated several provisions of the traffic code.29 How-
ever, they urged the Court to adopt a different Fourth Amendment test 
for traffic stops, given the large number of traffic rules and the difficulty 
of complying with all of these rules; the test the petitioners proposed 
was: “whether a police officer, acting reasonably, would have made the 
stop for the reason given.”30 Such a test, petitioners argued, would also 
prohibit officers from using traffic stops as “a means of investigating 
other law violations, as to which no probable cause or even articulable 
suspicion exists” and from deciding “which motorists to stop based on 
decidedly impermissible factors, such as the race of the car’s occu-
pants.”31 The petitioners framed this approach as being consistent with 
“the balancing inherent in any Fourth Amendment inquiry. . . 
weigh[ing] the governmental and individual interests implicated in a 
traffic stop.”32 
The Court rejected these arguments, noting that “[w]ith rare excep-
tions not applicable here . . . the result of that balancing is not in doubt 
where the search or seizure is based upon probable cause.”33 In addition, 
the Court stated: “Not only have we never held, outside the context of 
inventory search or administrative inspection . . . that an officer’s mot-
ive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amen-
dment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary.”34 While 
agreeing that selective enforcement of the law based upon race was 
 
26. See Lawton, supra note 5, at 922 & n.32 (citing cases). 
27. Id. at 922 & n.33 (quoting United State v. Valdez, 931 F.2d 1448, 1450 (11th 
Cir. 1991)). 
28. Id. at 922–23, 923 n.34. 
29. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. Both Brown and Whren are African Americans. Id. 
32. Id. at 816. 
33. Id. at 817. 
34. Id. at 812. 
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constitutionally prohibited, the Court ruled that the Equal Protection 
Clause, not the Fourth Amendment, was the constitutional basis for 
objecting to intentional discrimination: “Subjective intentions play no 
role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”35 
Some members of the Court have expressed concern about the “dis-
turbing discretion” afforded to a police officer who can “trail a targeted 
vehicle with a driver merely suspected of criminal activity, wait for the 
driver to exceed the speed limit by one mile per hour, arrest the driver 
for speeding, and conduct a full-blown inventory search of the vehicle 
with impunity.”36 However, the Court has reaffirmed its holding that a 
police officer’s subjective intentions are not relevant when the officer 
acts with objective probable cause.37 For example, in Florida v. 
Jardines,38 the Court stated: 
a stop or search that is objectively reasonable is not vitiated by 
the fact that the officer’s real reason for making the stop or search 
has nothing to do with the validating reason. Thus, the defendant 
will not be heard to complain that although he was speeding the 
officer’s real reason for the stop was racial harassment.39 
II. Departing From the Federal Approach 
After Whren, the majority of states that considered a claim under 
their own state constitutions that the police had made a pretextual 
traffic stop followed the federal precedent even if the state had used a 
different test prior to the Supreme Court’s decision.40 Nevada, for exam-
ple, had followed the Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Federal Circuits in 
 
35. Id. at 813. 
36. Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 729, 772–73 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) 
(quoting State v. Sullivan, 16 S.W.3d 551, 552 (Ark. 2000)).  
37. See Lawton, supra note 5, at 926 & n.64 (citing lower court decisions that 
upheld traffic stops regardless of an officer’s actual motives). 
38. 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). 
39. Id. at 1416. 
40. See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 767 N.E.2d 638, 649–50 (N.Y. 2001) (listing 
state courts that have analyzed Whren); Holland v. State, 696 So. 2d 757, 
759 (Fla. 1997) (finding that because the Florida Constitution conforms to 
the United States Constitution, the “reasonable officer test . . . is overruled 
by the objective test of Whren”); State v. Bolduc, 722 A.2d 44, 45 (Me. 1998) 
(citing Whren and noting that “[w]hether a reasonable police officer would 
normally have stopped Bolduc for exceeding the speed limit by nine miles 
per hour is not important to the analysis”); State v. Harrison, 846 N.W.2d 362, 
366 (Iowa 2014) (noting that although an officer’s motivations for making 
a traffic stop are not controlling, the “possibility for racial profiling requires 
[the court] to carefully review the objective basis for asserted justifications 
behind traffic stops” (quoting State v. Taylor, 830 N.W.2d 288, 297 n.4 (Iowa 
2013))). But see Harrison, 846 N.W.2d at 371, 373 (Appel, J., dissenting) 
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applying the “would have” test to cases in which the defendant alleged 
a pretextual traffic stop had occurred.41 Thus, in one case the Nevada 
Supreme Court vacated the defendant’s drug conviction on the grounds 
that, “but for the improper purpose of searching defendant’s truck for 
drugs, a reasonable officer would not have made the stop.”42 In another 
application of the test, the Nevada Supreme Court upheld a defendant’s 
drug conviction where it concluded that “any reasonable officer, absent 
suspicion of an unrelated serious crime, would have pulled over [the 
defendant’s] vehicle.”43 Subsequent to the Whren decision, however, and 
in spite of concerns about “the use of minor traffic infractions as a 
general law enforcement tool for investigating serious crimes,”44 the Ne-
vada Supreme Court concluded that “the Nevada Constitution’s search 
and seizure clause provides no greater protection than that afforded 
under its federal analogue, at least in the area of pretextual traffic stops, 
we now recognize the ‘could have’ test announced in Whren as the 
proper test under the Nevada Constitution as well.”45 
Only Washington and New Mexico have determined that their state 
constitutions provide broader protection than the United States Consti-
tution on the issue of when a traffic stop is reasonable. Alaska courts 
have discussed the issue but have not yet decided the question. Wash-
ington, the first state to adopt the “would have” test, has now revisited 
its decision and uses a somewhat different standard; this is discussed in 
Part D. 
 
(noting that whether a pretext stop is valid under the Iowa Constitution 
has not yet been decided, and until then, “[t]he State will likely take the 
position that the decision to stop a vehicle will rest in the unreviewable 
discretion of the police regardless of pretext. Sounds a bit like a general 
warrant, doesn’t it?”). 
41. Gama v. State, 920 P.2d 1010, 1012 (Nev. 1996) (citing Alejandre v. State, 
903 P.2d 794, 796 (Nev. 1995)). 
42. Id. (citing Alejandre v. State, 903 P.2d 794, 796 (Nev. 1995)). 
43. Taylor v. State, 903 P.2d 805, 808 (Nev. 1995), overruled by Gama, 920 P.2d 
at 1012–13. 
44. Gama, 920 P.2d at 1013 n.3. 
45. Id. at 1013 (noting that after Whren, the “bottom line, therefore, is that the 
‘could have’ test prevailed over the ‘would have’ test”). See also State v. 
Donaldson, 380 S.W.3d 86, 92 (Tenn. 2012) (holding in the context of traffic 
stops, the protections afforded by the Tennessee Constitution are coextensive 
with the Fourth Amendment protections set forth in Whren; therefore, “there 
is no absolute prohibition against a pretextual stop so long as the stop has 
legitimate underpinnings”); State v. Mancia-Sandoval, 361 S.W.3d 835, 839 
(Ark. 2010) (noting that as long as the officer had probable cause to make a 
traffic stop, “this court will not allow a police officer’s ulterior motives to serve 
as the basis for holding a traffic stop unconstitutional” even if stop is admittedly 
pretextual). 
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A. Washington State Part 1 
In 1999, in State v. Ladson,46 the Washington Supreme Court add-
ressed the issue of whether pretextual traffic stops violated the Wash-
ington State Constitution. A brief description of the facts is warranted. 
In Ladson, two officers on proactive gang patrol recognized the driver 
in a vehicle based on an unsubstantiated street rumor that he was 
involved in narcotics.47 The officers followed the car and then stopped 
it on the asserted grounds that the license plate tabs had expired.48 
Both the driver and the passenger, Thomas Ladson, were African Amer-
ican.49 The driver was arrested due to a suspended license and in a 
search of the vehicle, the officers found Ladson’s jacket with a small 
handgun inside; he was arrested, searched, and narcotics were discover-
ed in his jacket.50 Ladson was charged with and convicted of several 
counts involving the handgun and the narcotics.51 At the suppression 
hearing, the officers had not denied that the traffic stop was pretextual, 
although they did have objective probable cause that a traffic infraction 
had occurred due to the expired license plate tabs.52 
On appeal to the Washington Supreme Court, Ladson argued that 
the Washington State Constitution provides broader protection against 
pretextual traffic stops than the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution; therefore, he argued, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
holding in Whren was inapplicable to his case.53 The Washington Sup-
reme Court agreed, finding that the state constitution placed greater 
emphasis on privacy than the Fourth Amendment.54 Without a warrant 
or an exception to the warrant requirement, police action was without 
the “authority of law” required by the state constitution; a “pretextual 
traffic stop occurs when a police officer relies on some legal authoriz-
ation as ‘a mere pretext to dispense with [a] warrant when the true 
reason for the seizure is not exempt from the warrant requirement.’”55 
 
46. 979 P.2d 833 (Wash. 1999). 
47. Id. at 836. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 837. 
54. Id. 
55. State v. Arreola, 290 P.3d 983, 989 (Wash. 2012) (quoting State v. Ladson, 
979 P.2d 833, 842 (Wash. 1999)). 
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The Washington Supreme Court held that in determining whether 
a traffic stop was pretextual, a reviewing court must examine the to-
tality of the circumstances, “including both the subjective intent of the 
officer as well as the objective reasonableness of the officer’s behavior.”56 
This test was similar, the court ruled, to one used to determine whether 
the emergency exception to the warrant requirement applied: “To sat-
isfy the exception, the State must show that the officer, both subjective-
ly and objectively, ‘is actually motivated by a perceived need to render 
aid or assistance.’”57 In essence, the test adopted by the Washington 
Supreme Court in Ladson is the “would have” test: would a police offi-
cer, who is actually motivated to make the traffic stop based upon the 
traffic infraction, have made the stop? 
In an article published in 2008, I examined Washington state case 
law to see how the “would have” test worked in practice a decade after 
the adoption of the test.58 This examination revealed that 
although the “would have” test identifies police pretextual behav-
ior in limited circumstances—such as when police admit such 
behavior—it has not done so as much as commentators had pre-
dicted. The reason for this is not clear. It could be that there are 
not as many instances of pretextual police behavior as comment-
ators had thought or that courts have difficulty discerning pre-
textual behavior without an admission. A third alternative is that 
courts have been reluctant to find pretextual behavior without 
direct testimony from officers, because it is difficult to separate 
out an officer’s real motives. If, for example, there is objective 
probable cause of a traffic violation, as well as evidence that an 
officer’s initial suspicions were not based on the traffic violation, 
how does a court determine the officer’s actual reason for the 
stop? Does the court run the risk of suppressing evidence “when 
there were, in fact, good intentions sufficient to justify the action 
notwithstanding the bad intentions”? Also, by determining when 
it is reasonable for a police officer to ignore violations of the law, 
is the court substituting its own judgment for the police offi-
cer’s—and the legislature’s—as to what the officer “should have” 
done?59 
In the years since 2008, Washington courts continued to decide 
traffic stop cases. In the few cases in which the court found the traffic 
stop to be pretextual, there was a “pattern of the arresting officer hav-
ing a suspicion of nontraffic related criminal activity and subsequently 
 
56. Ladson, 979 P.2d at 843. 
57. Id. (quoting State v. Angelos, 936 P.2d 52, 54 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997)). 
58. Lawton, supra note 5, at 935–39. 
59. Id. at 918–19 (footnote omitted). 
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following an arrestee’s vehicle until a traffic infraction occur[ed], initiat-
ing the stop, and discovering evidence of an unrelated crime during a 
search incident to arrest.”60 In most cases the courts found the traffic 
stop to be lawful.61 
As discussed below, Washington has now added another layer to 
its traffic stop jurisprudence, by finding that there is a third type of 
traffic stop, a mixed-motive stop, which might or might not be legal. 
B. New Mexico 
At the end of 2008, the New Mexico Court of Appeals departed 
from the Whren test and found that pretextual traffic stops violate the 
New Mexico Constitution.62 In doing so, the New Mexico Court of App-
eals noted a “‘distinct characteristic of New Mexico constitutional law’” 
that individuals do not have a lower expectation of privacy when they 
 
60. State v. Johnson, 154 Wash. App. 1043, at *4 (2010). Unpublished decisions 
of the Washington Court of Appeals do not create legal precedent. See Wash. 
Ct. G.R. 14.1(a) (2016) (“A party may not cite as an authority an unpublished 
opinion of the Court of Appeals.”). 
61. See, e.g., State v. Snapp, 275 P.3d 289, 301 (Wash. 2012) (finding that a 
traffic stop was not pretextual when the officer noticed the traffic infraction 
and immediately stopped the car due to the traffic infraction); State v. Weber, 
247 P.3d 782, 788 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (finding that it was “objectively 
reasonable for [the patrol trooper] to stop a car [speeding] through a residential 
area . . . in the middle of the night”); State v. Das, 162 Wash. App. 1063, 
at *4 (2011) (finding that traffic stop was not pretextual because the officer 
was on routine patrol and pulled car over as soon as he observed traffic 
violations); State v. Johnson, 154 Wash. App. 1043, at *2–4 (2010) (finding 
that a traffic stop was not pretextual because the officer testified that he 
stopped vehicle because registered owner’s license was suspended, which 
is a criminal offense, and evidence did not follow the “classic” pattern of 
a pretext stop); State v. Gibson, 219 P.3d 964, 968 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) 
(finding that traffic stop was not pretextual because the officer did not state, 
nor could it be inferred from the totality of the circumstances, that he used 
the traffic violation as “an excuse to investigate suspected criminal activity”). 
Cf. State v. Michaels, 165 Wash. App. 1031, at *5 (2012) (finding that traffic 
stop was lawful because it was based upon reasonable suspicion that defendant 
was involved in drug activity and officers never claimed other motivation for 
the stop). 
62. State v. Ochoa, 206 P.3d 143, 146 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008). In State v. Ochoa, 
182 P.3d 130, 136 (N.M. 2008) (Ochoa II), the New Mexico Supreme Court 
remanded the case to the Court of Appeals instructing that court “determine 
whether the stop was pretextual and, if so, whether [the New Mexico 
Constitution] prohibits pretextual stops.” The New Mexico Supreme Court 
has followed the Court of Appeals on this issue. See Schuster v. State Dep’t 
of Taxation & Revenue, Motor Vehicle Div., 283 P.3d 288, 297 (N.M. 2012) 
(“New Mexico has departed from United States Supreme Court precedent 
in Whren . . . by holding that pretextual traffic stops are constitutionally 
unreasonable.”) (citations omitted). 
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are in a vehicle.63 Rejecting the “mechanical federal rule” of Whren, the 
court referenced its own precedent: “Our courts reject ‘bright-line rules 
that would have held certain categories of searches or seizures to be per 
se reasonable so long as there was probable cause.’”64 In light of “the 
ubiquity of driving in this country,” the “extensive regulation of all 
manner of driving subjects virtually all drivers to the whim of officers 
who choose to selectively enforce the traffic code for improper purpos-
es.”65 
In Ochoa, the court described a pretextual traffic stop as “a deten-
tion supportable by reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe 
that a traffic offense has occurred, but [that] is executed as a pretense 
to pursue a ‘hunch,’ a different more serious investigative agenda for 
which there is no reasonable suspicion or probable cause.”66 The court 
noted that “[t]he purpose of the reasonable suspicion [and] probable 
cause exception to the warrant requirement—to prevent officers from 
acting on unsupported hunches—is not furthered when our courts refuse 
to examine the unconstitutional hunch motivating the stop.”67 
To determine whether a traffic stop was a pretextual “subterfuge,” 
a court should review “the totality of the circumstances, judge the cred-
ibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence, make a decision, and exclude 
the evidence if the stop was unreasonable at its inception. . . includ[ing] 
considerations of the objective reasonableness of an officer’s actions and 
the subject intent of the officer—the real reason for the stop.”68 A re-
viewing court should follow a three-step approach for this inquiry: 
First, the State has the burden to establish reasonable suspicion 
to stop the motorist. If the State fails in its burden, the stop is 
 
 
63. Ochoa, 206 P.3d at 151 (citing State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 25 P.3d 225, 231 
(N.M. 2001)). 
64. Id. at 152–53 (quoting State v. Rodarte, 125 P.3d 647, 651 (N.M. Ct. App. 
2005)). 
65. Id. at 150 (noting that the concern with the “practically limitless discretion 
afforded officers enforcing traffic laws is not merely hypothetical”). See State 
v. Peterson, 315 P.3d 354, 358 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013) (noting that the rationale 
of Ochoa does not apply when officers are executing an arrest warrant, 
“even when they must first stop the vehicle to do so;” the warrant limits 
the officers’ discretion and thus a traffic stop to execute the warrant is consti-
tutionally reasonable); State v. Boynton, No. 33,373, 2015 WL 4357148, at 
*2 (N.M. Ct. App. June 29, 2015) (noting that Ochoa applies to traffic stops, 
not to investigatory detentions of citizens on foot). Unpublished decisions of the 
New Mexico Supreme Court or Court of Appeals do not create legal precedent, 
but may be cited for persuasive value. See NMRA, R. 12-405 (2015).  
66. Ochoa, 206 P.3d at 152. 
67. Id. at 153. 
68. Id. at 155. 
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unconstitutional. Second, if the State satisfies its burden, the 
defendant may still establish that the seizure was unreasonable 
by proving that the totality of the circumstances indicates the 
officer had an unrelated motive to stop the motorist that was not 
supported by reasonable suspicion. If the defendant does not satis-
fy the burden, the stop is constitutional. Third, if the defendant 
satisfies the burden, there is a presumption of a pretextual stop, 
and the State must prove that the totality of the circumstances 
supports the conclusion that the officer who made the stop would 
have done so even without the unrelated motive.69 
However, suppression of evidence “is only required if the ‘unrelated 
motive . . . was not supported by reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause.’”70 
The Ochoa court provided a nonexhaustive list of “pretext indi-
cators” that may be relevant to such an inquiry: 
whether the defendant was arrested for and charged with a crime 
unrelated to the stop; the officer’s compliance or non-compliance 
with standard police practices; whether the officer was in an 
unmarked car or was not in uniform; whether patrolling or enfor-
cement of the traffic code were among the officer’s typical employ-
ment duties; whether the officer had information, which did not 
rise to the level of reasonable suspicion or probable cause, relating 
to another offense; the manner of the stop, including how long 
the officer trailed the defendant before performing the stop, how 
long after the alleged suspicion arose or violation was committed 
the stop was made, how many officers were present for the stop; 
the conduct, demeanor, and statements of the officer during the 
stop; the relevant characteristics of the defendant; whether the 
objective reason articulated for the stop was necessary for the 
protection of traffic safety; and the officer’s testimony as to the 
reason for the stop.71 
 
69. State v. Gonzalez, 257 P.3d 894, 898 (N.M. 2011) (citing State v. Ochoa, 206 
P.3d 143, 155–56 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008)). In Gonzalez, the officer had admitted 
in the trial court that the traffic stop was pretextual. Id. On appeal, the New 
Mexico Supreme Court remanded the case for clarification of whether the 
officer “lacked a reasonable suspicion for the unrelated motive—a narcotics 
investigation.” Id. “Under Ochoa III, this analysis is a necessary prerequisite 
to concluding that a pretextual stop is unconstitutional.” Id. (noting that 
defendant bears the burden of proving that the “‘real motive’ for the stop was 
not supported by a reasonable suspicion”). 
70. State v. Alderete, 255 P.3d 377, 381 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. 
Ochoa, 206 P.3d 143, 156 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008)).  
71. Ochoa, 206 P.3d at 156. 
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In Ochoa, the court found that the defendant had established a 
presumption that the stop was pretextual which the state did not over-
come; therefore, the traffic stop was invalid.72 
New Mexico courts have subsequently applied this test in a number 
of cases. However, despite ostensibly applying a more stringent stan-
dard than the Whren test to review traffic stops, New Mexico courts 
rarely seem to find that police officers have made traffic stops on pre-
textual grounds in the absence of an admission of pretext or other cir-
cumstance.73 
In one case in which the New Mexico Court of Appeals did find the 
traffic stop to be pretextual and thus unlawful, the officer’s testimony 
regarding motive appeared to be crucial to the court’s holding. In State 
 
72. Id. at 157 (finding that the state did not demonstrate that the officer had a 
reasonable suspicion to justify his motive for having the defendant stopped). 
73. See, e.g., Alderete, 255 P.3d at 381 (finding that traffic stop was lawful and 
that the officers had reasonable suspicion of traffic violations as well as 
reasonable suspicion for the “unrelated motive” for stopping defendant’s 
car—to investigate suspicions of drug activity); State v. Flores, No. 30,024, 
2010 WL 4162294, at *3 (N.M. Ct. App. May 11, 2010) (finding that traffic 
stop was lawful and stating that “[t]he officer’s motives for stopping the 
vehicle . . . matched the ‘objective existence of reasonable suspicion’” that 
the driver was driving while impaired) (quoting State v. Ochoa, 206 P.3d 
143, 156 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008)); State v. Allen, No. 30,367, 2012 WL 5835393, 
at *4 (N.M. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2012) (finding that traffic stop was not pre-
textual because defendant did not establish that officer had an unrelated 
motive at the time of the traffic stop for a broken headlight); State v. Vallejos, 
No. 30,043, 2011 WL 2042050, at *3–4 (N.M. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2011) (finding 
that traffic stop was not pretextual and that defendant’s theory of pretext 
did not appear credible and plausible in light of evidence); State v. Tapia, No. 
32,868, 2013 WL 5309804, at *1–2 (N.M. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2013) (noting 
that under the Ochoa decision, an officer is not prohibited from having more 
than one suspicion about defendant and in the instant case, officer stopped 
defendant due to traffic safety concerns based upon several facts and thus 
stop was not pretextual); State v. Medellin, No. 32,652, 2013 WL 4537087, at 
*2 (N.M. Ct. App. May 6, 2013) (finding that traffic stop was not pretextual); 
State v. Skippings, 338 P.3d 128, 130, 132 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014) (noting that 
parties had stipulated that sole purpose of traffic stop was to investigate 
informant’s tip and, therefore, the question was not whether stop was pre-
textual but rather was there reasonable suspicion to support the stop); State 
v. Scharff, 284 P.3d 447, 451 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012) (finding that defendant 
did not meet the burden of demonstrating that traffic stop was pretextual); 
State v. Perea, No. 30,071, 2010 WL 4161011, at *2 (N.M. Ct. App. May 19, 
2010) (finding that stop was not pretextual because it was based on reasonable 
suspicion of drug activity); State v. Trujillo, No. 31,860, 2012 WL 2892206, 
at *1 (N.M. Ct. App. June 4, 2012) (finding that the traffic stop was not 
pretextual); State v. Still, No. 29,378, 2011 WL 2042296, at *5 (N.M. Ct. App. 
March 16, 2011) (finding that stop was not pretextual because “the officer’s 
initial motive for following the vehicle matched the ‘objective existence of 
reasonable suspicion’”). 
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v. Deleon,74 the officer admitted that he made traffic stops for minor 
infractions to then investigate other offenses.75 The defense also present-
ed witnesses whose testimony established a pattern of stops for minor 
infractions.76 Based upon this pattern evidence and the officer’s admis-
sion, the court found that there was substantial evidence that the officer 
used a minor traffic infraction “to pursue his hunch that Defendant was 
driving while intoxicated, for which there was no reasonable suspicion 
or probable cause.”77 
C. Alaska 
Alaska courts have determined that it has not yet been necessary 
to decide whether the doctrine of pretext applied under the Alaska 
State Constitution, generally because the defendant had failed to allege 
sufficient facts to raise the question.78 Instead, Alaska courts “have 
clarified that the doctrine does not apply to all instances where a police 
officer has an ulterior motive for making a traffic stop. Rather, a traffic 
stop is a ‘pretext’ only if the defendant proves that, because of this 
ulterior motive, the officer departed from reasonable police practices by 
making the stop.”79 
 
74. No. 30,813, 2013 WL 4511939 (N.M. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2013). 
75. Id. at *4. 
76. Id.  
77. Id. 
78. See Morgan v. State, 162 P.3d 636, 638–39 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007) (finding 
it unnecessary under the facts of the case to decide whether to apply Whren 
or pretext doctrine); Grohs v. State, 118 P.3d 1080, 1081–82 (Alaska Ct. App. 
2005) (finding that even if pretext doctrine applied, defendant had not alleged 
sufficient facts to come within doctrine); Nease v. State, 105 P.3d 1145, 1148 
(Alaska Ct. App. 2005) (finding it unnecessary on facts of case to decide 
whether to adopt the Whren test or the Ladson test as a matter of state 
law). Cf. Way v. State, 100 P.3d 902, 905 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004) (“[T]he 
classic pretext search is one where the police follow a suspect based on the 
theory, as set out by the Ladson court, that the suspect will certainly commit 
a traffic violation within a short period of time which will give the police the 
opportunity to stop the suspect for the traffic violation and then search the 
suspect and the vehicle”). 
79. Chase v. State, 243 P.3d 1014, 1019 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010) (citations 
omitted); Nease, 105 P.3d at 1149 (“[I]f the police stop [a motorist’s] car for 
minor offense A, and they subjectively hoped to discover contraband during 
the stop so as to establish serious offense B, the stop is nonetheless lawful if 
a reasonable officer would have made the stop in the absence of the [ulterior] 
purpose.”) (alterations in original) (quoting 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 1.4(e), at 118 
(3rd ed. 1996)). The court first has to determine whether there was sufficient 
justification, either reasonable suspicion or probable cause, to support the stop. 
If this does not exist, then there is no need for the court to address anything 
further. 
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As the court has explained, even under the pretext doctrine, the 
officer’s subjective motivation is not the issue.80 Instead, the reviewing 
court looks to the totality of the circumstances, to determine whether 
the officer departed from “reasonable police practice,” taking into acc-
ount that: 
There are numerous factors that a police officer may properly 
consider when deciding whether to stop a motorist for a traffic 
violation, including the egregiousness or seriousness of the viol-
ation (i.e., whether it poses a danger to safety), any earlier police 
contacts with the motorist or the vehicle, the time of day or night, 
the weather and road conditions, and the press of other business 
(or lack thereof).81 
Alaska courts have applied the “reasonable police practices” test in 
a number of cases involving claims that the officer engaged in a pre-
textual traffic stop, and found that the traffic stop was proper.82 Critics 
argue that use of this standard has “nearly the same effect as the object-
ive standard” set forth in Whren.83 These critics argue that Alaska 
 
80. Nease, 105 P.3d at 1149. 
81. Id. 
82. See, e.g., Laschober v. State, No. A-11302, 2014 WL 7005586, at *5 (Alaska 
Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2014) (finding that defendant “made no showing that [officer] 
departed from reasonable police practices by stopping him for driving at night 
without his lights illuminated and for crossing the centerline”); Brockway v. 
State, No. A-10659, 2011 WL 563082, at *4 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2011) 
(“Like Nease, Brockway presented no evidence suggesting that police officers 
never stop motorists to issue citations for commercial vehicle violations.”); 
Marley v. State, No. A-9285, 2006 WL 1195668, at *4 (Alaska Ct. App. May 
3, 2006) (finding that defendant “failed to meet the minimum evidentiary” 
showing to bring the traffic stop into the doctrine of pretext stops because 
defendant did not show that the state trooper departed from reasonable police 
practices by making the stop in the circumstances); Olson v. State, No. A-
8595, 2005 WL 1683588, at *3 (Alaska Ct. App. July 20, 2005) (finding that 
defendant’s claim of pretext failed because she presented no evidence that the 
stopping officer departed from reasonable police practice); Bessette v. State, 
145 P.3d 592, 595 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006) (finding that defendant failed to 
prove that trooper departed from reasonable police practice); Murphy v. 
Municipality of Anchorage, No. A-10345, 2010 WL 986688, at *3 (Alaska Ct. 
App. Mar. 17, 2010) (finding that defendant failed to prove that officer 
departed from reasonable police practices due to some ulterior motive); 
Polushkin v. State, No. A-10153, 2009 WL 1259357, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. 
May 6, 2009) (finding that defendant did not show that trooper departed 
from reasonable police practice in making the stop). 
83. Jeff D. May, Rob Duke & Sean Gueco, Pretext Searches and Seizures: In 
Search of Solid Ground, 30 Alaska L. Rev. 151, 176 (2013). Alaska courts 
have found that “[i]f the traffic stop was within what would be expected of 
a reasonable officer in that situation, irrespective of the fact that there were 
other subjective motivations that could not have been independently acted 
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should adjust the application of the reasonable officer standard by con-
forming the standard to other jurisdictions like New Mexico.84 
D. Washington State Part 2: Another Layer Is Added 
In 2012, the Washington Supreme Court revisited the question of 
what types of traffic stops are legal under the Washington State Consti-
tution pursuant to its Ladson decision. In State v. Arreola,85 the Court 
was presented with the question of “whether a traffic stop motivated 
primarily by an uncorroborated tip, but also independently motivated 
by a reasonable articulable suspicion of a traffic infraction, [was] un-
constitutionally pretextual” under the Washington State Constitution 
and the Ladson decision.86 In Arreola, the trial court had found that 
the officer’s primary motivation for performing the traffic stop at issue 
was to investigate a reported drunk driving tip but that a muffler viol-
ation was also an “actual reason for the stop.”87 
The Supreme Court noted that it “is commonly accepted that full 
enforcement of traffic and criminal laws by police officers is both im-
possible and undesirable.”88 Just as police officers must exercise discre-
tion in determining which criminal laws to enforce, police officers “must 
exercise wide discretion in deciding which traffic rules to enforce, and 
when to enforce them, in furtherance of traffic safety and the general 
welfare.”89 In a pretextual traffic stop, 
a police officer has not properly determined that the stop is rea-
sonably necessary in order to address any traffic infractions for 
which the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion; instead, 
the traffic stop is desired because of some other (constitutionally 
infirm) reason—such as a mere hunch regarding other criminal 
activity or another traffic infraction—or due to bias against the 
suspect, whether explicit or implicit. A pretextual stop thus dis-
turbs private affairs without valid justification and is unconsti-
tutional.90 
The court interpreted Ladson as a case where “the officer abused 
his discretion by conducting the stop without deeming it reasonably 
 
upon, then the court of appeals has concluded that the stop was not pretext.” 
Id. at 186. 
84. Id. at 186. 
85. 290 P.3d 983 (Wash. 2012). 
86. Id. at 986. 
87. Id. at 987. 
88. Id. at 989. 
89. Id.  
90. Id. at 990. 
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necessary to enforce license plate tab regulations.”91 In the case at hand, 
however, the trial court had found that the “actual reason for the stop” 
was the exhaust infraction and that the officer would have stopped for 
this infraction even without the previous DUI tip.92 Thus, this was a 
mixed-motive stop, based on both legitimate and illegitimate grounds, 
unlike the stop in Ladson which was pretextual. 
The court found that a mixed-motive stop does not violate the 
Washington State Constitution “so long as the police officer making the 
stop exercises discretion appropriately.”93 If the “officer makes an inde-
pendent and conscious determination that a traffic stop is reasonably 
necessary” to address a suspected traffic infraction, to further “traffic 
safety and general welfare, the stop is not pretextual.”94 
That remains true even if the legitimate reason for the stop is 
secondary and the officer is motivated primarily by a hunch or 
some other reason that is insufficient to justify a stop. In such a 
case, the legitimate ground is an independent cause of the stop, 
and privacy is justifiably disturbed due to the need to enforce 
traffic regulations, as determined by an appropriate exercise of 
police discretion. Any additional reason or motivation of the offi-
cer does not affect privacy in such a case, nor does it interfere 
with the underlying exercise of police discretion, because the offi-
cer would have stopped the vehicle regardless.95 
The court noted that police officers “cannot and should not be ex-
pected to simply ignore the fact than an appropriate and reasonably 
necessary traffic stop might also advance a related and more important 
police investigation.”96 In such a situation, “an officer’s motivation to 
remain observant and potentially advance a related investigation does 
not taint the legitimate basis for the stop, so long as discretion is appro-
priately exercised and the scope of the stop remains reasonably limited 
based on its lawful justification.”97 
To determine whether a challenged traffic stop is pretextual, the 
reviewing court “should consider both subjective intent and objective 
circumstances in order to determine whether the police officer actually 
exercised discretion appropriately:”98 
 
91. Id. at 991. 
92. Id. at 987. 
93. Id. at 991. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 991–92. 
96. Id. at 992. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
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The trial court’s inquiry should be limited to whether investig-
ation of criminal activity or a traffic infraction (or multiple infrac-
tions), for which the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion, 
was an actual, conscious, and independent cause of the traffic 
stop. The presence of illegitimate reasons for the stop often will 
be relevant to that inquiry, but the focus must remain on the 
alleged legitimate reason for the stop and whether it was an 
actual, conscious, and independent cause.99 
In Arreola, because the traffic infraction was the “actual, conscious, 
and independent cause of the traffic stop,” the court found that the 
stop was not pretextual.100 
Two justices dissented, stating disbelief that “the spirit of Ladson 
will survive the court’s opinion in this case.”101 The reasoning used by 
the majority, Justice Chambers wrote, “is for all practical purposes in-
distinguishable from the reasoning this court rejected in Ladson.”102 
Justice Chambers cautioned, “[g]oing forward, police officers in Wash-
ington will be free to stop citizens primarily to conduct an unconsti-
tutional speculative investigation as long as they can claim there was 
an independent secondary reason for the seizure.”103 The majority noted 
though, that Washington courts will continue to review challenged 
stops for pretext.104 
Washington courts have decided a number of cases in the few years 
since Arreola. In most cases the courts have found the stop to be consti-
tutional as a mixed-motive stop.105 
 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 993 (Chambers, J., dissenting). 
102. Id. 
103. Id.  
104. Id. at 990–91 (“Although there are concerns that some police officers will 
simply misrepresent their reasons and motives for conducting traffic stops 
. . . the possibility that police officers would engage in such wrongdoing only 
heightens the need for judicial review of traffic stops. . . . [O]fficers are 
expected to adjust their practices to be consistent with the law.”). 
105. See, e.g., State v. Edwards, 189 Wash. App. 1039, at *4 (2015) (finding that 
the traffic stop was not pretextual because the officer “was actually motivated, 
both subjectively and objectively, by the need to address the traffic violation 
rather than by some other investigative purpose”); State v. McGovern, 187 
Wash. App. 1031, at *5 (2015) (finding that traffic stop was not pretextual 
and, even assuming that officers’ had an “ulterior motive” for stopping the car 
based on suspicion of drug activity, the traffic stop was lawful in light of the 
speeding violation); State v. Jones, 347 P.3d 483, 487 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) 
(finding that traffic stop was not lawful because there was no reasonable 
suspicion of a traffic violation to support the stop); State v. Kelly, 180 Wash. 
App. 1041, at *3 (2014) (finding that the traffic stop was not pretextual 
because, under the totality of the circumstances, the gang unit detectives 
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Conclusion 
While the Whren test does provide “clear guidelines for police, 
prosecutors, and courts as to what is considered reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment, it also has real limitations for constraining . . . 
abuse of that discretion, such as racial profiling.”106 However, it is not 
clear that the states have found the right balance to constrain abuse of 
police discretion yet. Washington, the first state to use the “would 
have” test, now recognizes that a traffic stop might be lawful even if 
the officer is motivated primarily by a hunch or suspicion that is insuffi-
cient to justify the stop. Arguably, this is the “could have” test in an-
other guise or with another layer added. And, while New Mexico seems 
to have the most stringent approach to reviewing traffic stops, in 
practice New Mexico courts have rarely seemed to find pretext. While 
Alaska has not yet decided whether to adopt the pretext doctrine, Alas-
ka courts have noted that even under that doctrine, the officer’s subjec-
tive motivation is not the decisive factor. 
Scholars and others have made various proposals about alternative 
means to address the use of pretext.107 Professor Lewis Katz has written 
that the Supreme Court should, among other suggestions, “limit police 
from stopping for trivial traffic offenses unrelated to highway safety 
[and] to forbid police to arrest for traffic offenses without a separate 
justification.”108 Whether the Supreme Court will so hold in future cases 
is to be seen. In the meantime, Washington’s relatively new mixed-
motive test, while still a version of the “could have” test, may come the 
closest to providing a reviewing court the means to consider whether 
the police used their discretion appropriately.  
were motivated both subjectively and objectively by the need to investigate 
the traffic violation); State v. Trenary, 183 Wash. App. 1005, at *3–4 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2014) (finding that traffic stop was a “mixed-motive” stop and 
therefore lawful when the officers, who were in special unit that proactively 
investigates crime, were motivated by a desire to investigate suspected drug 
activity, and the stop was “reasonably necessary” to promote traffic safety 
and general welfare due to suspected traffic infraction); State v. Burr, 180 
Wash. App. 1045, at *2–3 (2014) (finding that traffic stop was not pretextual 
because “Arreola does not require the officer to explicitly state that this stop 
[was] ‘necessary for the general welfare’” and here, officer testified that he 
stopped for traffic infraction although he had suspicions that defendant was 
driving under the influence); State v. White, 177 Wash. App. 1027, at *8 
(2013) (finding that White was lawfully stopped and seized when asked to 
step out of the car); State v. Bonds, 299 P.3d 663, 669 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) 
(finding traffic stop was lawful when the officers stopped car due to probable 
cause that driver was committing a misdemeanor); State v. McLean, 313 P.3d 
1181, 1186 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) (finding that traffic stop was not pretextual 
because the officer “had reasonable suspicion that [driver] was driving under 
the influence” and traffic stop was executed to investigate that crime). 
106. Lawton, supra note 5, at 958. 
107. Id. at 958–59 & nn.293–98. 
108. Katz, supra note 6, at 1471. 
